FERC Filings

EMERGENCY MOTION OF THE ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER

Introduction

In the October 19th Order, the Commission announced an expedited process for addressing the recently experienced instabilities affecting the California electric power markets. The Commission took the unusual step of announcing this process in advance so that all parties and affected interests would understand that the Commission intended to act expeditiously, based on its Staff investigative findings and the public record to be developed in the announced proceedings. The Commission’s process contemplates a unique opportunity for all interested parties and the Commission to identify and take steps to fix the problems that are stalling and destabilizing the transition from regulation to competition in California.

On October 26, 2000, the CAISO Board subverted the Commission’s process by imposing unilaterally a punitive load differentiated price cap, to be effective November 3, 2000, or as soon thereafter as can be implemented. The CAISO Board’s precipitous actions flout the Commission’s plenary authority to direct remedies for identified problems adversely affecting competitive power markets in California. If allowed to stand, the CAISO’s unilateral price caps will exacerbate an already stressed situation and will undermine the good faith that all parties should display in advocating remedies to the Commission and in exploring settlement options.
In the current, politically charged atmosphere, the credibility of the Commission’s process for making a fair, reasoned and comprehensive decision, based on a reviewable, public record, must be maintained. The CAISO Board’s unilateral action on price caps tears at that credibility. If the proceedings that the Commission is to commence on November 1, 2000, are to retain their primacy and effectiveness in comprehensively addressing the market-wide problems that the Staff has investigated, the Commission must ensure that no party be allowed to implement unilateral changes in the existing core market rules governing the wholesale power markets in California. When the CAISO acts unilaterally, it negates parties’ rights to file meaningful public comments. The Commission must not allow one party, the CAISO, to alter the playing field while the Commission considers the efficacy of possible remedies for addressing California’s flawed electricity markets. The CAISO cannot be permitted to make the Commission’s decisions for it, or to alter so radically market rules, thereby injecting more uncertainty and confusion in the market and subverting the process for fashioning fair, effective and comprehensive remedies.
^{(3)See e.g., Complaint, Request to Institute Cost-based Rates, and Motion To Consolidate of the California Municipal Utilities Association, Docket No. EL01-1-000, filed Oct. 6, 2000; Complaint, Californians for Renewable Energy, Inc., Docket No. EL01-2-000, filed Oct. 6, 2000; Joint Motion for Emergency Relief and Further Proceedings of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, and the Utility Reform Network, Docket Nos. EL00-95-000, EL00-98-000, EL00-104-000, EL00-107-000, filed Oct. 16, 2000; Motion for Interim Relief of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, all above-referenced dockets, filed Oct. 19, 2000; Proposed Offer of Settlement Tendered by the California Independent System Operator Corp., Docket Nos. EL00-95-000, EL00-98-000, filed Oct. 20, 2000; Answer of San Diego Gas & Electric Company in Support of Joint Motion for Emergency Relief and Further Proceedings, Docket Nos. EL00-95-000, EL00-98-000, EL00-104-000; EL00-107-000, filed Oct. 20, 2000.}

^{(4)
The CAISO Board also subverted its own by-laws by having taken action on a load differentiated price cap proposal that had not been clearly set forth in the public notice of the agenda for the Board meeting, as is expressly required under Section 9.2 of the CAISO by-laws.}

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